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Abstract:  
The Ulster Loyalist community of Northern Ireland have long regarded themselves as a 
people besieged by Irish Republican ideology. While lacking international support, the 
Loyalists have formed a geographically and culturally unusual bond with the State of Israel. 
Loyalist support for Israel increased visibly during the 2002 Intifada and Loyalists continue 
to make declarations of support for Israel. Yet, the governing Likud Party in recent years has 
commemorated Zionist insurgents, who committed acts of terror against the British 
administration in the 1940s. The Israeli government’s actions have led to criticism from the 
Her Majesty’s British government, which the Loyalist community aims to stand alongside, to 
maintain the Union and prevent the triumph of Irish Republicanism.  Despite British public 
support for Israel declining during the past few decades, Ulster Loyalist support for the 
Jewish State is believed to be one of the strongest in Europe.  
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1. Introduction 
 “We unfortunately find ourselves in a conflict in our area and we certainly don’t want to 
export conflict from our part of the world, we would rather try and be part of reconciliation 
and understanding. On the other hand, I have respect for people who have a parallel between 
their story and the story of the people of Israel.”1 
Daniel Taub, 2013. 
In 2013, former Israeli Ambassador to the United Kingdom, Daniel Taub visited Belfast and 
encountered the unusual sight of Israeli and Palestinian flags flying across the city. The 
Israeli flags were being flown by the Loyalist community, those in Northern Ireland who 
identify as part of the United Kingdom as opposed to the Republicans who seek unification 
with the rest of Ireland. In the year 2002, an increase in Israeli flags in Loyalist areas of 
Belfast and across Northern Ireland was recorded and this has continued into the present.2 
Alongside this, an increased discourse regarding Israel has become more apparent in Loyalist 
newspapers and expressions of solidarity with Israel has become more vocal. This however is 
not reflected amongst the wider British public, which has become more sympathetic towards 
Palestinian self-determination and increasingly critical of Israel’s actions.  While Israeli flags 
continue to fly on the Loyalist streets of Belfast, in London we see protests in opposition to 
the Balfour Declaration, standing in solidarity with Palestine.3 This is a one-way relationship; 
you will not find Northern Irish flags or Loyalist symbols in Jerusalem. Loyalists appear 
content to provide Israel with support and receiving little in return. In addition, the governing 
Likud Party has been involved in commemorating the members and actions of various 
terrorist organisations that fought against the British in the 1940s. This is of course the same 
Britain which Loyalists have such a strong desire to be a part of. Surprisingly, these apparent 
contradictions have remained largely unspoken within the Loyalist community. Only a few 
condemnatory voices have shared their concern about the hypocrisies that exist in supporting 
a country whose government is happy to celebrate terrorist actions against Britain. Clearly, 
there is an awareness of the apparent contradictions in solidarity with Israel, but there is a 
                                                 
1 Sam McBride, “Ambassador ‘torn over Israel flags in NI’”, News Letter, February 21, 2013, 
https://www.newsletter.co.uk/news/ambassador-torn-over-israel-flags-in-ni-1-4810799. 
2 Andrew Hill et al, “The Flying of Israeli Flags in Northern Ireland” Identities 15, no.1, (2008): 33. 
3 Areeb Ullah, “Thousands march through London to oppose Balfour Declaration”, Middle East Eye, November 
4, 2017, http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/thousands-marched-through-london-oppose-balfour-declaration-
498366841. 
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lack of willingness to confront them. Any criticism is supressed by the voices of Loyalists 
who continue to promote their support for Israel. 
In academia, when Northern Ireland and Israel are discussed together, what usually entails is 
a comparative discussion about partition politics or conflict resolution. This study shall not be 
a comparison between the two conflicts but rather focus on the specific, existing phenomena 
of Loyalist solidarity with Israel. It shall look at solidarity with Israel through the lens of 
transnational solidarity, utilising scholarly works in this field. In particular, Rawan Arar’s 
work on solidarity with the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict by factions in the Northern Irish 
Troubles and her theory of borrowed legitimacy. The key objective shall be to provide proof 
that Loyalist solidarity rose sharply in 2002 and has continued to maintain a solid presence in 
Loyalist civic society, despite Likud’s commemorations of Zionist terrorist atrocities against 
the British during the 1940s. It shall be argued that Loyalist solidarity with Israel increased 
due to the community’s view that it is under siege from its Republican nemesis, fuelled by 
various negotiations and demographic change. This has led to a sense of vulnerability and a 
longing for allies in what they perceive as a hostile world. Therefore, Loyalists have harked 
back to their historic memory of the religious glorification of the Israelites and translated this 
to a modern affinity with the state of Israel. Israel is a quaint choice to support, as it can also 
be used against the Loyalist’s local “other”, who have displayed solidarity with Palestinians, 
for different, anti-Imperialist reasons.  
This study will provide empirical evidence for the rise of Loyalist solidarity in 2002 and 
show its continuation to date. Evidence shall be presented in three key areas: Firstly, the 
development of British-Israeli diplomatic relations and the transformation of British public 
opinion. Secondly, Loyalist attitudes towards Israel; in order to highlight the contrasts 
between Loyalists and the British public. In doing so, Loyalist expressions of solidarity shall 
be discussed along with newspaper sources to show the bias in favour of Israel . The existence 
of solidarity prior to 2002 shall be explored and contrasted with the changes post 2002. 
Finally, focusing on the commemorations by Likud of Zionist terrorists and their 
organisations. In doing so, establishing that there is an immediate ideological contradiction in 
Loyalists supporting a Likud-run Israel, while it commemorates those who used terrorism 
against Britain. The empirical evidence in this study presents ample evidence for the 
formulation of an argument.  
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The study will then focus on investigating reasons for the rise and continuation of solidarity 
with Israel. It will thematically compile an argument as to why solidarity with Israel has 
continued amongst Loyalist. It shall focus on the Loyalists perception of their situation, 
viewing themselves as under siege from threatening foes. This shall consider the Loyalist 
belief that they are continually losing ground to Republicans and how they perceive 
themselves in the eyes of the international community. It shall also discuss why they seek 
solidarity with Israel. The realities of how similar their situations actually are, shall be 
questioned and it shall explore if there is any merit in such comparisons. Following from this 
it shall explore the significance of Israel to the historic-religious memory of the Loyalist 
community. This shall evaluate how significant religious memory might be in the growth of 
solidarity with Israel and how it has affected Loyalist perceptions of Israel. Finally, it shall 
provide support for Arar’s ‘borrowed legitimacy’ theory and discuss the strengths of her 
study. While it is important to be critical of aspects of this study, it has proved very useful 
and insightful, when tracing the growth of Loyalist solidarity with Israel.   
The potential difficulties that emerge in producing such a study must be acknowledged. 
Specifically, that the Ulster Loyalist community tends to perceive themselves as a people 
under siege and being regarded unfavourably by the international community. Therefore, it 
can be defensive when directly asked about their political logic. It will also consider the 
animosity that exists between opposing sides, in both the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict and the 
Irish Troubles, which can lead to bias and a constant need to be antagonistic towards their 
perceived “other”.  
In seeking answers to this research question, this study aims to fill gaps that exist in the body 
of literature surrounding the discourse of transnational solidarity; focusing on the Israeli -
Palestinian Conflict and its internationalisation. Most work relating to Northern Ireland and 
the Israeli Conflict is comparative, and focuses on conflict resolution and partition politics. 
Studies on transnational solidarity, generally focus on the Republican relationship with the 
Palestinians. The Loyalist-Israeli dynamic does not have the same quantity of coverage. In 
particular, scant attention has been given to the contradictory ideological elements of Loyalist 
solidarity with Israel, in relation to commemorations of Zionist terrorism. While the topic of 
this study may appear rather niche, it has significance. The political arm of the Loyalist 
community, the Democratic Unionist Party, in the summer of 2017 agreed a deal of 
“confidence and supply” with the governing Conservative Party in Westminster, which has 
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already created interest in Israel due to the DUP’s ideological position.4 The utilisation of 
borrowed legitimacy in relation to transnational solidarity has not been widely applied to the 
Middle East, making it a novel approach. Also, Arar did not focus her own study on Israel or 
Loyalists, but rather on solidarity between both conflicts as a whole. Greater specificity can 
allow for a much deeper examination of her concept. This work hopes to expand upon 
notions of transnational solidarity within Middle Eastern Studies and to challenge Arar’s 
concept of borrowed legitimacy within the discipline. By advancing the study of Loyalist 
solidarity with Israel, critiquing the limitations of borrowed legitimacy in the process, our 
view of transnational solidarity can be further modified and developed to increase 
understanding as to why solidarity exists on the international level and in a Middle Eastern 
context.  
 
1.1 Methodology 
In seeking to prove that solidarity for Israel exists within the Loyalist community, the well -
established, ‘Belfast News Letter’ was used as the key primary source. The Belfast News 
Letter or the ‘News Letter’, has been in circulation since 1737. The logic for utilising it was 
simple; it is the only daily newspaper in Northern Ireland that is explicitly politically 
supportive of the Loyalist community. The paper has historically, gone as far as to advertise 
itself “For Protestants” and has been associated with promoting the hard-line loyalist, Orange 
Order. 5 Along with news articles, the paper also contains an opinion section which provides 
views from columnists in Northern Ireland and also members of the public. The Israeli-
Palestinian Conflict features with reasonable frequency in these sections and this helps 
provide insight into Loyalist opinion of the conflict and its combatants. One limitation, is that 
one cannot be completely sure that the author is a Loyalist, when not clearly stated. However, 
with the evidence from academic sources and the fact that the News Letter is considered a 
Loyalist media outlet, within a highly tribal society, we can safely assume that the vast 
majority of these pieces in support of Israel, if not all, are coming from Loyalist sources. 
                                                 
4 Tamara Zieve, “UK Jewish Leader: Kingmaker DUP is friend of the community and Israel”, Jerusalem Post, 
June 9, 2017, http://www.jpost.com/Diaspora/UK-Jewish-leader-Kingmaker-DUP-is-friend-of-the-community-
and-Israel-496399 
5 Claire Nally et al, Advertising, Literature and Print Culture in Ireland, 1891-1922. (London: Palgrave 
MacMillan, 2012): 137. 
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To provide empirical evidence for the rise of Loyalist solidarity with Israel, data was 
collected from the News Letter. This was gained from two databases, the Factiva archive and 
the News Letter website archive. The Factiva archive provided articles from 1st January 
1998, to the end of 2017. The key search used was “Israel” to provide all articles that mention 
Israel in some shape or form. To increase the relevance of the articles, the category chosen 
was “Domestic Politics”, providing a closer link between the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict and 
Northern Ireland and British politics. The database also allowed for the exclusion of a 
number of categories, and both “football” and “sports” were deemed acceptable for 
exclusion, whereas other categories were not, as they may have had some relevance to this 
study. These filtering actions led to the number of articles, going from 1,600 to 105, the 
original number too great for the time constraints that existed on this study. The inclusion of 
a second database, the News Letter’s online archive, was due to the omission of opinion 
pieces in the Factiva database. It provided valuable evidence of the Loyalist public’s view of 
the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. Once again, “Israel” was used as the search word and any 
sports articles excluded in the data count, as were the 15 articles found in the Factiva count 
that appeared after 2009. The two databases were given separate charts to allow for easier 
replication of the data. One of the main limitations of the data gathering, was the lack of cost 
free material prior to 1998. If more time and financial resources were available greater insight 
into the period prior to 1998 may have been achieved.  
With the data collected from the databases, textual analysis, as described by Alan McKee, 
was used to decipher information.  McKee argued that textual analysis is essentially an 
“educated guess” at the interpretations that could be made of the text in question and that it is 
effective for research within cultural/area studies.6 Textual analysis lends itself well to this 
study, in part due to there being no need for translation, therefore the nuances of language are 
not lost. The climate of tribalism within Northern Ireland and the need for groups and 
individuals to promote their identities and beliefs, makes the application of textual analysis 
even more interesting.  There are of course some limitations to textual analysis, as cultural 
differences can provide unique interpretations of texts which must be acknowledged.7 In 
addition, a text may have multiple interpretations and this study has attempted to convey this, 
when applicable. The application of textual analysis, allowed for the language in the News 
                                                 
6 Alan McKee, Textual Analysis. (Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications, 2002):1.  
7 McKee, Textual:4. 
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Letter to be heavily scrutinised and compared with that of British public opinion to 
demonstrate the differences between them.   
In analysing the changes in British attitudes towards Israel, there was an abundance of 
resources available.  To grasp the changes within public opinion, polls were consulted from 
three periods: a) Post-Israeli independence b) shortly after the Six-Day War c) the most 
recent data. The first two polls were provided by Public Opinion Quarterly and the other by 
YouGov. British Diplomatic relations, specifically grievances with Israel, were analysed via a 
collection of British and Israeli newspapers, including Haaretz, Times of Israel, the Guardian 
and the Telegraph. The aim was to provide some balance and allow for an awareness of bias. 
Grievances were focused upon, as this kind of event could then be applied to newspapers and 
other media in Northern Ireland to ascertain how the Loyalist community interpreted these 
events.   
Finally, in answering the question, why solidarity arose, despite the obvious conundrum; the 
research method focuses mainly on text based sources. Interviews were considered for this 
process; however, it was not deemed necessary, as many of the Loyalists have already 
provided reasons for their solidarity with Israel and many scholars have also given their 
opinion on the issue. The sources provide a mixture of primary data, mainly from news 
outlets in Northern Ireland and the rest of the UK and secondary data which mainly came 
from academic research. This provides a variety of views and a solid mass of qualitative data 
that could be applied to this thesis.  
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2. Literature Review 
2.1 Overview of the Literature  
Most of the literature that associates Northern Ireland with the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict is 
made of comparative studies. They generally focus on partition politics and the peace 
processes in both conflicts. One of the seminal works in this field is Thomas G. Mitchell’s 
Native vs Settler: Ethnic Conflict in Israel/Palestine, Northern Ireland and South Africa. It 
analysed the dynamics between ethnic groups, where one is viewed as the coloniser and the 
other the colonised.8 Mitchell argues that colonial rule has been established in certain areas of 
the world, by the importation of a different ethnic group who has imposed discrimination 
over the indigenous population.9 This is one of the earlier studies to make mention of the 
existence of a “siege mentality” within settler communities. It explores the religious 
dynamics of settler communities, whereby they view themselves as “chosen people.”  10 While 
perhaps lacking in theoretical analysis, the sheer breadth of material on native-settler 
dynamics, in relation to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict and the Troubles is impressive. Many 
studies have followed from Mitchell’s work: McGarry11 and Cox et al12 have made 
comparisons of the settler conflict in Northern Ireland and Israel-Palestine, focusing on the 
divisions created in society. It is worth noting the inclusion of South Africa as a third setting 
in most of these comparative works. This is due to the ease with which settler communities 
can be compared, as they have all possess some similar variables. Settler communities 
usually begin with a small number of isolated settlements and must contest with the local 
“other” which settlers, such as the Afrikaans of South Africa, often attempted to subjugate. 
They also have similar identifiable traits, as pointed out by Akenson, who argues that settler 
communities generally appear aggressive towards outsiders and immovable on social 
issues.13 Another example of settler colonialism, is Rhodesia post-UDI. Rhodesia appears to 
have been omitted from comparative studies involving Israel-Palestine and Northern Ireland, 
                                                 
8 Thomas G Mitchell, Native vs Settler, (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2000): 1.  
9 Mitchell, Native vs Settler: 15.  
10 Ibid: 20.  
11 John McGarry, Northern Ireland and the Divided World, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). 
12 Michael Cox et al (eds.) A farewell to arms?, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2006).   
13 Donald H. Akenson, God’s Peoples, (Ithica, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992): 42.  
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which is unusual, as Rhodesia had similar settler dynamics of an imported minority 
dominating a local majority. 
More specific comparisons have been drawn in relation to the impact of partition politics on 
society. Literature and the way partition politics has shaped post-partition works was 
undertaken by Cleary14, and by Patke15. Other specific fields have included; the impact on 
social work by Ramon et al16 and education and how it can be mobilised for fostering mutual 
understanding between warring ethnic groups (Saloman17). However, this study does not 
intend to add to the existing literature in the field of comparative studies, but rather focus on 
transnational solidarity.  
The politics of solidarity has been addressed by a fairly modest body of work. However, there 
are several key works that have been explored within this study. They are the most focused 
pieces of work, which specifically touch on notions of solidarity between factions involved in 
the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict and the Troubles. The first is John Doyle’s Irish Nationalism 
and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, in which Doyle aims to examine links that have been 
generated by Irish nationalists with the participants in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Doyle 
explores the difference between the solidarity of Sinn Fein and the foreign policy of the 
Republic of Ireland. The Republic’s foreign policy is in his view, the face of moderate 
nationalism. This contrasts with Sinn Fein, which he considers to be radical in its expression 
of nationalism. This is significant, as this is a study that deals with the Republican 
perspective for the most part. Much of the solidarity within this study, is related to the 
relationship between the Irish Republican Army and the Palestinian Liberation Organisation.  
What is interesting about Doyle’s study, is that he provides evidence of actual physical links 
between the two conflicts; joint training exercises and gun-running operations.18 However, 
Doyle’s study lacks a definitive answer, as to why the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict is so 
significant in Northern Ireland, compared to other international struggles for self-
                                                 
14 Joe Cleary, Literature, Partition and the Nation State, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
15 Rajeev Patke, “Partition and its aftermath: Poetry and history in Northern Ireland”, Journal of Postcolonial 
Writing, 46, no. 1, (2010). 
16 Shulamit Ramon et al, “The Impact of Political Conflict on Social Work”, British Journal of Social Work, no. 
36, (2006).  
17 Gavriel Salomon, “Lessons from Research on Peace Education in Israel/Palestine”, Asian Journal of 
Peacebuilding, 1, no. 1, (2013). 
18 John Doyle, “Irish Nationalism and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict”, Working Papers in International Studies: 
Centre for International Studies, (2007): 2. 
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determination. What it does achieve is a chronology of solidarity, particularly from a 
Republican perspective.  
One of the key limitations of these solidarity studies, is that most of their focus is on 
Republican solidarity for Palestine, whilst Loyalist solidarity with Israel is given less 
discussion time. Rolston19 is an example of this. He discusses the displays of solidarity shown 
through political murals in Northern Ireland. Most of his focus is on Republican artwork, 
which is not exclusively designated to Palestine, but also other struggles for independence 
such as Basque nationalism.20 Loyalist expressions of solidarity are only give a page and a 
half in Rolston’s study. Of course, there is no obligation for Rolston to provide study into 
Loyalists and as he points out, there are fewer examples of murals with international 
references that are Loyalist designs.21 Studies such as Tugwell22 and Drake23 have also 
focused on Republican transnational solidarity, through framing their struggle as an anti -
imperialist mission.   
In recent years however, studies have started to give a much greater balance between 
Republican and Loyalist. Andrew Hill and White, provide an in-depth analysis of flag flying 
in Northern Ireland in their study The Flying of Israeli Flags in Northern Ireland. This study 
was motivated by the appearance of Israeli flags in Loyalist communities in 2002, a 
phenomenon that they consider to be unprecedented and felt had received “scant scholarly 
attention”.24 Hill et al explore the significance of Israeli flags appearing in Loyalist areas of 
Belfast and open the door to more discussion about Loyalist solidarity with Israel. What is 
also so effective, is that Hill et al refer to the contradictions that can exist when promoting 
another ethnic group, under the banner of transnational solidarity. While not directly dealing 
with the issue of this thesis, they do highlight the relationship with right-wing British 
nationalism, which tends to hold anti-Semitic views and the flying of Israeli flags.25 The 
exploration of this issue, certainly influenced the themes behind this thesis. 
                                                 
19 Bill Rolston, “Brothers on the Walls: International Solidarity and Irish Political Murals”, Journal of Black 
Studies, 39, no. 3, (2009). 
20 Rolston, “Brothers”: 456. 
21 Ibid: 465-67. 
22 Maurice Tugwell, “Politics and propaganda of the provisional IRA”, Terrorism, 5, no. 1-2, (1981).  
23 C.J.M Drake, “The provisional IRA”, Terrorism and Violence, 3, no. 2 (1991).  
24 Hill et al, “Flying Israeli Flags”:32.  
25 Ibid:39-40.  
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While studies have recently began to focus on Loyalist transnational solidarity with Israel to a 
greater degree, there is very little literature that focuses on Loyalists alone. Studies on 
Loyalists have focused more on Loyalist identity, rather than solidarity, such as Alan 
Finlayson.26 If other Loyalist solidarities with peoples across the globe exist, then they too 
appear to lack coverage in scholarly works. Therefore, it comes as no surprise that the 
contradictions mentioned, have received no attention from scholars and the only references to 
them can be found in the odd newspaper article and online blog post. This study will focus on 
this void and attempt to begin to fill this gap in the literature.  
 
2.2 Defining Transnational Solidarity 
Studies of solidarity are widespread throughout a variety of academic disciplines. Solidarity 
is perceived to be a concept of providing a group, community or nation with a sense of 
belonging and togetherness. It has also been suggested by Christian Smith, that sol idarity is a 
feeling that invokes relationships that are characterised by a social or emotional bond.27 In 
terms of a single nation, according to Eric Hobsbawm and Tom Nairn, the binding factors are 
commonly along the lines of ethnicity or civic boundaries.28 Solidarity, has often been 
associated within nation-building, as in Benedict Anderson’s concept of the ‘imagined 
community.’ Anderson argues that a focal point is drawn from the past of an ethnic group or 
those living within a geographical boundary, that is designed to inspire nationalistic solidarity 
within the present-day nation state.29  Emile Durkheim, argued in his work The Division of 
Labour in Society, the existence of two forms of solidarity; the mechanic and the organic. 
Mechanic solidarity, found in primitive societies, where solidarity was characterised on 
commonality; similar values which were generated, due to similar experiences and common 
life situations. Organic solidarity, is more reliant on dependence rather than commonality. It 
arises when societal members differ, however they depend upon each other or are constrained 
by one another within the functions of a society.30 
                                                 
26 Alan Finlayson, “Loyalist Political Identity After the Peace”, Capital & Class, 23, no. 3, (1999). 
27 Christian Smith et al, “On Social Solidarity”, in The Palgrave Handbook of Altruism, Morality, and Social 
Solidarity: Formulating a Field of Study, ed. Vincent Jeffries, (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2014): 225. 
28 Tim Rowse, “Nation”, in Identity and Belonging, eds. Kate Huppatz et al, (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 
2015): 107. 
29 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities. (New York: Verso, 2006): 4. 
30 J. A. Barnes, “Durkheim’s Division of Labour in Society”, Man, 1, no.2, (1966): 163-164.  
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Few studies focus on the transcendent nature of solidarity on an international scale. Anderson 
gets close to touching upon it, when he notes the “curious trans-state character” of solidarity. 
In analysing 19th colonialism, Anderson found that colonial rulers from multiple nation states 
were able to draw on racialist “solidarity among whites”. Internal rivalries and conflicting 
interests within European-Western settings were irrelevant to this solidarity’s existence.31  
Advocate of anarchism, Pytor Kropotkin is one of the first scholars to apply solidarity to the 
international level. Solidarity to Kropotkin was a form of “mutual aid” which has been of 
crucial importance in the evolution of social institutions. Kropotkin does not limit this merely 
to the nation state but mankind as a species (his study also includes animals) and how 
solidarity has led to their development.32  
It is important to note the difference between transnational solidarity, which this study 
focuses on and international solidarity, which has greater traction in studies of international 
relations. International solidarity focuses on the role of the state as the primary player in 
solidarity, mainly taking the form of treaties and alliances.33 Transnational solidarity, focuses 
on non-state actors, such as activist groups and is often associated with the growing 
phenomenon of Globalisation and identity politics. According to Patricia Landolt, transitional 
solidarity has increased in recent years, as agendas in different nation states can now connect 
due to the increased ability to create global networks.34 In Middle Eastern Studies, 
transnational solidarity has often been associated with Palestine. Laleh Khalili has focused on 
solidarity between political organisations such as Hezbollah and the Palestinians and 
specifically ‘South-South’ transnational solidarity. Khalili noted the importance of 
overlapping identities such as ‘anti-imperialist’, ‘Islamist’ or ‘pan-Arabist’, as influencing 
factors of transnational solidarity.35 Timothy Seidel, also studied forms of transnational 
solidarity in Palestinian resistance and the support received from Europe.36 
                                                 
31 Anderson, Imagined Communities: 153.  
32 Petr Kropotkin, Mutual Aid: A Factor of Evolution, (Rookhope: Aziloth Books, 2017): 1-9.  
33 Guillaume Devin, “International Solidarity” in International Encyclopaedia of Political Science, (eds.) 
Bertrand Badie et al, (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 2011): 1320.  
34 Patricia Landolt, “The Transnational Geographies of Immigrant Politics”, The Sociological Quarterly, 49, 
no.1, (2008): 53.  
35 Laleh Khalili, “Standing with My Brother”, Comparative Studies in Society and History, 49, no. 2, (2007): 
277-278.  
36 Timothy Seidel, “Occupied territory is occupied territory”, Third World Quarterly, 37, no. 9, (2016). 
15 
 
Other studies of transnational solidarity focus more on activist groups with ideological 
similarities. Latin America has received a lot of attention from scholars in this field. 
Solidarity from transnational organisations with the Zapatistas, the left-wing revolutionaries 
of Mexico, was explored by Abigail Andrews in 2010.37 The other area which has seen 
significant coverage is transnational feminist solidarity. Lindsey Churchill, brings together 
both Latin America and radical feminism in the US, in her study into American feminists’ 
attempts at solidarity with Latin American revolutionary movements between 1970 and 1989. 
Thus, giving insight into the relationship between first and third world feminism.38 Basuli 
Deb through an Orientalist lens, takes the focus on feminism into a Middle Eastern context, 
in her study of Imperial feminism and the West’s attempts at solidarity.39 It is interesting that 
there appears to be a lack of scholarly work on transnational solidarity in relation to Israel. 
This is an area in which this study would hope to go some way in addressing.   
 
2.3 The Concept of Borrowed Legitimacy 
Rawan Arar’s study, International Solidarity and ethnic boundaries, provides focus on both 
Republican-Palestinian and Loyalist-Israeli dynamics. Arar also produces her own theoretical 
framework for the reasoning behind forms of transnational solidarity, known as ‘borrowed 
legitimacy’. This is a recent concept, which has yet to receive any scrutiny in its application 
to Loyalist solidarity with Israel. It is worth noting that while Arar makes reference to 
‘international solidarity’, it is in association with non-state actors, having more akin with 
transnational solidarity. Arar focuses on “ethnic boundaries” rather than existing political 
boundaries when explaining solidarity in the setting of Northern Ireland and Israel-
Palestine.40 However Barth, defines ethnic boundaries as channelling societal life and argues 
that those within this channel hold certain elements of identification that allow a fellow 
member of that ethnic group to identify them as “one of their own”.41 According to Barth 
                                                 
37 Abigail Andrews, “Constructing Mutuality: The Zapatistas’ Transformation of Transnational Activist Power 
Dynamics”, Latin American Politics and Society, 52, no.1, (2010).  
38 Lindsey Churchill, “Transnational Alliances: Radical U.S. Feminist Solidarity and Contention with Latin 
America, 1970-1989”, Latin American Perspectives, 36, no. 6, (2009):10.  
39 Basuli Deb, “Cutting Imperial Feminisms towards Transnational Feminism Solidarities”, Meridians, 13, no. 2, 
(2016).  
40 Arar, “International solidarity”: 2.  
41 Fredrik Barth (ed.), “Introduction” in Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organisation of Culture 
Difference, (Long Grove: Waveland Press, 1998): 15. 
16 
 
there is then an assumption that those identified as the same ethnic group are “playing the 
same game”, and that their ethnic relationship can expand within a specific space to genera te 
an “ethnic boundary”.42 This has a similar constructed dynamic to that of Anderson’s 
“Imagined Community”, which proposes that nationalist solidarity is created from relevant 
cultural systems and shared elements of culture such as religion or dynasticism.43 When 
relating this to Northern Ireland, Arar defines the boundary as the “different 
circumstances…either a political stance or a personal identity or both”.44 In comparison, 
Israeli-Palestinian ethnic boundaries could more easily be defined as between those who are 
ethnically Arab Palestinians and those who identify as Israeli Jews. Marco Giugni et al, have 
suggested that solidarity on the global stage is altruistic in nature. They argue that those 
involved in political movements that share solidarity transnationally, do so to “defend the 
rights and interests of others”.45 There is a similar argument from Guillaume Devin, who 
states that ethnic groups use transnational solidarity as a tool to strive for “mutual 
empowerment” while promoting a common cause, a form of transnational activism.46 
Borrowed legitimacy, challenges these traditional views of solidarity or at least, adds another 
dimension to it. Arar, is critical of the common assumption that solidarity is purely a tool for 
mutual benefit and an act of selflessness to help those in need. She argues that too much 
focus has been given to the cultural aspects that lead to solidarity, rather than the need to 
form and maintain an ethnic boundary. She also claims there is insufficient study of 
expressions of solidarity that adopt a foreign ally and therefore create a new foreign 
opposition. This is where borrowed legitimacy takes place. It is an attempt to attack a local 
“other” by proxy, by engaging within an existing boundary between the ally to which 
solidarity is given and her adversary.47 The new international ethnic boundary, is then 
adopted as an expression of solidarity and then used to reinforce the adopter’s own local 
boundary and attack the local “other” with it.48 
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Borrowed legitimacy, is then placed by Arar into the scenario of existing solidarities between 
factions in the Troubles and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, to provide weight to her theory. 
This so far, is the only context to which borrowed legitimacy has been applied. Arar, provides 
a broad application to this scenario, rather than focusing on a specific dynamic within it. 
Arar, argues that solidarity linking the Troubles to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict comes 
down to three main points. Firstly, that there are similarities between the struggles for self-
determination, both are regions that have experienced settler-colonial foundations, during 
British rule. Secondly, she argues that both regions have experienced partition, with varying 
levels of success. Finally, the existence of debates surrounding inter-communal violence, has 
led to parallels being drawn over forms of resistance.49 These are the conditions which Arar 
argues, led borrowed legitimacy to take place.  
There is certainly strength in the argument that solidarity could be utilised to attack a local 
“other” by proxy. However, this thesis intends to question aspects of Arar’s argument of 
borrowed legitimacy by focusing on Loyalist solidarity with Israel. Umbrage is taken with the 
conditions that Arar suggests have led to borrowed legitimacy within the setting of the 
Troubles. Her focus appears to be more on Republican solidarity with Palestine and the 
process that led to borrowed legitimacy being utilised by Republicans. For example, when 
Arar focuses on “struggles” under settler-colonialism and “means and forms of resistance”; 
this indicates that she is referring to the indigenous population, resisting the settler colonisers, 
rather than incorporating settlers within this process.50 The application of borrowed 
legitimacy can be questioned regarding Loyalist solidarity with Israel, raising other potential 
factors that may provide other dynamics to this relationship, in the face of historical Zionist 
terrorism against the British.   
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3. Historical Context 
It is worth taking some time to look at the historical background of both the Troubles and the 
Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, to provide some context and a grasp of the terminology used in 
this study. It is especially important that the Troubles is provided with some analysis as it is 
obviously alien to the field of Middle Eastern Studies and the terminology which it uses.  
The Northern Ireland Conflict, more commonly referred to as ‘The Troubles’, refers to the 
period of conflict between Irish Republican militants and the Loyalist paramilitaries, 
involving the British security forces between 1968 and 1999.51 The conflict is often 
considered to be one of religion, between the Catholic and Protestant communities. However, 
Joanne McEvoy argues that this is a misinterpretation, arguing that the conflict was related to 
national identity; where the nationalist/republican “looks to the Republic of Ireland as the 
‘motherland’” and the unionist/loyalist community looks to the United Kingdom as “their 
patron state”.52 The nationalist/republicans wish to see Northern Ireland become united with 
the Republic of Ireland; while unionists/loyalists wish to remain part of the United 
Kingdom.53 McEvoy, also notes that the religious connotations in the conflict, derive from 
the fact that nationalists are “almost exclusively” Catholic and the unionist community is 
“overwhelmingly Protestant”, which McEvoy puts down to the history of the region.54 
McEvoy is perhaps underplaying the importance of religion in this conflict. The partition of 
Ireland in 1921, saw a sizable Catholic minority, separated from the Irish Free State 
(Republic of Ireland from 1949), who rapidly faced discrimination from the Protestant 
Loyalist population. The Loyalist population, was to an extent, indulged by the British 
establishment and had privilege over the Catholic minority, in jobs and housing.  Many 
Catholic Republicans found themselves impoverished in Northern Ireland and 
disenfranchised, despite the rebuttals from Loyalist politicians that discrimination existed.55 
By the late 1960s, the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association was created, similar to the 
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African American movement in the United States, it campaigned against the social injustices 
faced by Catholics. 1969 saw a series of riots take place as Civil Rights marches were 
attacked by Protestant mobs, essentially sparking the flame of the Troubles. Fighting took 
hold of the streets of Derry, leading to the deployment of British troops in August of 1969, in 
an attempt to restore order. The scenes from these riots and the chaotic situation that resulted, 
led to sections of the IRA (known as Provisionals) to arm and launch itself into the conflict.56 
In the decades that followed, up until the Good Friday Agreement of 1999, the IRA fought 
Loyalist paramilitaries and British security forces and conducted numerous terrorist attacks 
against civilians, many of which took place on mainland Britain against non-Irish Britons. 
The terror campaign conducted by the IRA, got to the very heart of the British establishment. 
The 1984 Brighton hotel bombing, saw the then Prime Minister Margret Thatcher narrowly 
escaped injury, when an IRA bomb blew up the hotel hosting members of the Cabinet, 
attending the annual Conservative Party Conference. Other members of her party were not so 
fortunate. It is estimated that around 1,800 people were killed by the IRA since the 1960s; 
around 650 are thought to have been civilians.57 Many civilians were also killed by Loyalist 
paramilitaries, who according to recent evidence, had some collusion with British security 
forces.58 Despite a ceasefire and the Good Friday Agreement, the societal divide is still highly 
evident to this day.59  
The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict has some similarities to the Troubles, notably the occurrence 
of terrorist attacks against civilians. While the Troubles appear to have ceased at the present, 
the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict is still very much alive. The Conflict is part of the wider Arab-
Israeli Conflict, which included multiple Arab states fighting against Israel during a number  
of wars; the most significant being the Arab-Israeli War of 1948, the Suez Crisis 1956, the 
Six-Day war of 1967, the Yom Kippur War of 1973, and the Israeli-Lebanese Conflict, which 
had its main phase between 1978-2006. The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict however, focuses on 
the Palestinian fight for self-determination against Israel. While this Conflict has its origins in 
Jewish immigration from Europe during the first half of the 20 th century, the 1970s saw its 
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intensification as the Palestinian Liberation Organisation launched attacks on Israel from 
Southern Lebanon. Strands of the PLO waged an international war against Israel, which saw 
hostage takings and killings, similar to that of the IRA and most notably during the 1972 
Olympic Games in Munich.60 As the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories dragged 
on, two key uprisings took place; the First Intifada of 1987-1993 and the Second Intifada 
which lasted from 2000 to 2005. The First Intifada was characterised by many of the 
Palestinians who practiced non-violent forms of resistance, such as boycotts and strikes. 
However, in a similar fashion to the 1969 riots in Northern Ireland, it soon set off an armed 
struggle which was supressed by the Israelis.61 Also in a similar vain to the IRA, the Second 
Intifada and its aftermath saw the increase in Palestinian terrorist tactics, including bombings. 
The Palestinians have yet to achieve the same measure of success as the Republican cause in 
Northern Ireland. To achieve a power sharing deal, similar to that of in Stormont would 
appear to be far more difficult in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, due to territorial demands 
and concessions, along with the right of return, neither of which were issues during the 
Troubles. Both conflicts have in common the role of Britain in their partition. It is however 
Britain’s relationship with Israel that will be most pertinent to the context of this study, 
viewing it alongside the opinion of the British public and Loyalists towards Israel. 
Since Israeli independence was carved out of the British Mandate of Palestine in 1948, 
relations with Britain have been mostly positive. Israel can be considered an ally of the 
British state in the Middle-East, without any real cause for debate. Historically, the 1917 
Balfour Declaration, provided the Zionist movement with the British government’s 
endorsement of “a national home for the Jewish people” in Palestine.62 From this point 
onwards, Britain became historically etched into the pages of the Arab-Israeli Conflict. 
Despite issues during the Mandate involving British attempts to curb Jewish immigration and 
a violent terrorist campaign led by Irgun and Lehi against the British administration; the 
outcome of Israeli independence essentially provided Britain with a stable ally in the Middle-
East.63 Israel’s success during the 1948 War, won over the support of British Army High 
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Command who were impressed with their victory. High Command, sought stronger ties with 
the Israelis, influencing the government towards this course of action. This came to fruition 
during the 1950s, when Britain provide Israel with sales of arms and technology. Britain 
struggled through this period to maintain a balancing act between the Israelis and the 
surrounding Arab states. It attempted to appear impartial, however it was well known that 
Britain, France and the United States had all signed a Tripartite agreement, which intended to 
assess arms deals with Middle Eastern States on a case by case basis. What became obvious, 
was that Israel was receiving the bulk of these weapons and had the greatest success in 
obtaining deals.64 During the 1967 ‘Six-day War’ Arab countries believed inaccurately that 
Britain, along with the United States, had lent air support to Israel. This seemed to push 
Britain further away from the Arab camp and at least appeared on the international stage, to 
be firmly on the side of Israel.65 The good relationship with Israel certainly had its benefits 
for Britain. According to Rosemary Hollis, Israel’s defeat of the Arab powers during the Six-
day war, reduced tension for Britain in the Middle East, amidst calls to grant its remaining 
territories in the region independence.66 Britain was able to secure a more peaceful transition 
of power in the Gulf States; leaving the British government with friendly ties and a series of 
treaties involving trade and defence cooperation.67  
Britain has continued its steady decline on the world stage and been forced to re-assess its 
position as a global power. Cooperation with the United States has become paramount and 
Britain has acted in support to US policy; more so since the 1990s and early 2000s. Its policy 
regarding the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, has been to assist in the peace process, while 
allowing the US to take the lead in motivating that process.68 More controversially, in 1979, 
Britain used its remaining influence on the United Nations Security Council to prevent Arab 
calls to conduct studies on Israeli nuclear capabilities.69 Yet the relationship has proved to be 
far from perfect.  Neill Lochery argues that British-Israeli relations have been in decline since 
the 1970s, with 1976 being a defining year. The aftermath of the Arab oil embargo, following 
the 1973 Yom Kippur war, led Britain to push for better relations with the Arab states in 
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order to maintain her oil supply. This led to the comment from Lord Greville Janner, “Oil is 
thicker than Jewish blood”.70 Lochery, also argues that Britain’s entry into the European 
Economic Community further complicated her relationship with Israel. He claims that French 
pro-Arab views were dominant within the EEC and Britain was forced to subscribe to this.71 
However, the Brexit vote in June of 2016 could make this argument void in the future.  
Other diplomatic grievances have taken place during the formative years of the 21st century. 
However, despite these grievances, it would be difficult to argue that the British government 
is not currently an ally of Israel. Recent statements from the British establishment make this 
clear. Former Prime Minister, David Cameron stated in an address to the Knesset in 2014, 
that Britain was committed to the provision of a peaceful and prosperous life for Jewish 
people in Israel and commented on a partnership between the two nations and a shared 
commitment to security.72 The current Prime Minister, Theresa May, in early November of 
2017, stated that she was “proud of our pioneering role in the creation of the state of Israel.” 
This was at a dinner commemorating the 100th anniversary of the Balfour declaration.73 
Comments that certainly do no harm in reinforcing the strength of British-Israeli relations.  
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4. Empirical Evidence 
4.1 Transformation of British Public Opinion 
While the British government continues a policy of support for Israel, it is in the public 
sphere where a shift in opinion can be most detected.  In the years immediately after Israel’s 
independence, British public opinion was divided. In a 1949 poll of 2,000 British adults, 
when asked the question “What is your attitude towards recognition by the Bri tish 
Government of an independent Jewish State as part of Palestine?”, the responses were mixed. 
35% of men and 32% of women were in favour of recognising Israel, however 35% of the 
former were also against recognition and 16% of the later. There was also a large amount of 
the sample who were undecided on the issue, with 30% of men and 52% of women being in 
this category.74 While support for Israel’s existence was stable at this point, those opposed to 
it are significant in number. What must be remembered is the timing of this poll. Britain had 
withdrawn from Palestine the previous year, after fighting a costly war against Zionist 
terrorists. Indeed, the actions of the Zionist insurgency proved poignant in the eyes of the 
British public in the late 1940s.  The two main insurgent groups, Irgun and Lehi conducted a 
campaign of terror against the British administration where calculated killings and bombings 
became commonplace. These tactics were viewed by paramilitary groups as necessary tools 
to allow for what they believed to be the liberation of the Jewish nation.75 The Zionist 
insurgents were met with distain in Britain and two damaging terrorist attacks led to a 
significant outcry. In July 1946, Irgun planted explosives in the British Military High 
Command in the King David Hotel, destroying part of the building and leaving countless 
British, Arab and Jewish personnel dead. It was claimed that everyone in the British 
Administration or army had an acquaintance or friend who was killed in the bombing. The 
British public’s will for remaining in Palestine was virtually nullified.76 The second, took 
place a year later in July of 1947. It was as a retaliation for the sentencing of two Irgun 
members to death. Two British Sergeants were abducted then later hanged with booby traps 
placed around their bodies. The response to this led Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin to tell US 
Secretary of State George Marshall that the executions “would never be forgotten” and that 
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“anti-Jewish feeling in England is now greater than it had been in a hundred years”.77 Indeed, 
this manifested itself in Britain with a wave of anger, creating anti-Jewish demonstrations and 
riots across the Country. These riots saw the burning down of a wooden Synagogue in Derby 
and Jewish shop keepers attacked in Glasgow. This all happened in spite of the condemnation 
of Irgun’s actions by the British Jewish community.78 However, in Europe and the United 
States, the Holocaust was still a very recent event, which had led many to feel a great deal of 
sympathy for the Jews and their right to a homeland in Palestine. It was felt in some circles of 
the international community that after the ordeal which the Jewish people had gone through, 
they should be given what they desired.79 However, the British experience in Palestine had 
been somewhat different. British soldiers serving in Palestine felt that the Jews were 
ungrateful for the protection provided to them and had little sympathy for their aims of a 
Jewish homeland.80 It is clear, that mixed emotions were felt by the British public with regard 
to Israel’s independence. 
It was during the 1950s and 60s that a major shift in British public opinion started to take 
place. Polls from 1955 and 1956 by Public Opinion Quarterly, had support for Israel, higher 
than the Arab States. The 1956 poll showed that 31% of Britons were supportive of Israel, 
compared to just 5% who backed Arab states.81 By the Six-Day War of 1967, support for 
Israeli had increased further. National Opinion Polls London, produced statistics shortly after 
the outbreak of war, found that 55% of those asked blamed the Arabs for the conflict. In 
contrast, just 3% believed that any of the responsibility for the war lay at Israel’s door.82 The 
reasons for such an increase in support for Israel, likely lie with several factors. Firstly, Israeli 
support can be partially attributed to the existence of animosity towards Arabs. The lack of 
support for Arabs in 1967, could be in part be due to the rise of Arab nationalism and 
Britain’s embarrassment during the Suez Crisis. Gamal Nasser’s collectivist call for unity in 
the Arab world against European colonialism, may have created an antagonistic “other” out 
of the Arab world.  However, this appears to have been of more concern to the Foreign Office 
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than the British Public, as there was a distinct lack of support for military action during 
Suez.83 Orientalist discourses of Edward Said, would argue that the Arab had been vilified 
and dehumanised in the European mind for centuries.84 This could have contributed to a 
racist attitude towards Arabs in Britain, where Jews were favoured over them. Without 
physical evidence this is difficult to prove, however the existence of an “orientalist tradition” 
would dictate that this was certainly possible.  
Barnet Litvinoff, argues that the British public’s support for Israel came out of a romanticised 
view of the Jewish State. According to Litivinoff, Israel was seen as a sanctuary for those 
who had been oppressed and suffered persecution in their native lands.  A poignant image 
was created of an oasis in the desert. The Jews were seen by the British public to have taken a 
land of desert and arid terrain and made it green and fruitful.85  This was certainly an image 
promoted by the Israeli government; Shimon Peres was quoted as saying that the land prior to 
the arrival of the Zionists “was mostly an empty desert with only a few islands of Arab 
settlement; and Israel’s cultivable land today was indeed redeemed from swamp and 
wilderness”.86 Alan George has questioned this, arguing that the expansion of cultivated land 
was under way before mass Zionist immigration.87 However, the whole basis for his study 
was due to the belief in Western society that Israeli’s had single handily reclaimed the land 
from the desert.88 Indeed, the British Minister to Tel-Aviv in Clement Attlee’s government, 
Alexander Knox Helm, admitted that Israel as “good showmen and propagandists” had been 
successful in wooing the British public.89 
By the early years of the 21st century, this had all changed. Israel was no longer the ‘darling’  
of the British public. Continued building of settlements in the West Bank and a long-standing 
occupation of the area had changed the way in which the British public perceive Israel. It was 
no longer looked upon as a place of refuge but rather an oppressor of Palestinian Arabs. As 
far back as 1980, Litvinoff argued that even the Jewish population in Britain had become 
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tired of Israel’s expansion into the Palestinian Territories.90 This notion has been reinforced 
in more recent years by Matthew Gould, the former British Ambassador to Israel, who 
claimed he had “detected a shift” in support for Israel within Britain. Gould also noted that 
this was no longer a fringe boycott movement but rather a mainstream view, which had been 
cultivated due to the expansion of settlements and stories about atrocities in the West Bank 
and Gaza.91 Polling supports these statements: In 2014, a YouGov poll found that only 
around 16% of Britons were sympathetic towards Israel, in comparison to 22% towards 
Palestine. Those in the 18 to 24-year-old bracket, were even less supportive of Israel, with 
only 10% identifying as pro-Israeli.92 As part of this shift away from Israel, multiple 
diplomatic grievances have taken place between Britain and Israel, along with countless acts 
of public outcry in Britain aimed at Israel. Some of these topics and events shall be discussed 
further in the following sections.  
 
4.2 Loyalist Contrast: Rise and Continuation Solidarity 
While the public in the United Kingdom has clearly shifted their support away from Israel 
during the latter half of the 20th century and more so during the formative years of the 21st 
century, this is not the case in of all the UK. Political allegiances may sway support for Israel 
one way or another, but this is generally down to the individual preference. It is uncommon 
for the vast majority of a community to support one side. In the UK, one such pro-Israeli 
community does exist; the Loyalist community of Northern Ireland. It is important to 
remember, the significance that Loyalists place on being British. Within the Loyalist 
community, symbols of both British history and achievement, alongside protestant history in 
Ireland, such as the Battle of the Boyne in 1690, are at the heart of their culture.93 The 
website of the DUP, before mentioning any of their economic or social policies, stresses 
several times that the party’s purpose is to “maintain and enhance Northern Ireland’s 
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constitutional position within the United Kingdom”. In fact, the UK is referred to five times 
in a mission statement consisting of merely 200 words. 94 
Despite the strong desire to be part of British society, there has been an interesting shift that 
has manifested itself since 2002, with regard to views on Israel. In April 2002, during the 
height of the Palestinian uprising, the Second Intifada, a unique characteristic appeared on the 
streets of Belfast. Both the Belfast News Letter and the Republican Irish News, reported that 
Israeli flags were making an appearance across the city in Loyalist areas. This was viewed as 
a reaction to the presence of Palestinian flags in Republican areas.95 What began as a series of 
flags across Belfast, has become part of Loyalist symbolism and ideology. Graffiti and 
murals appeared with slogans, such as ‘The West Bank of the Lagan (a unionist area) backs 
Ariel Sharon’.96 Association with conflicts in other parts of the world is common in Northern 
Ireland.97 However, Republicans are more likely to use international symbols than Loyalists, 
who generally stick to British symbols and those of their own Protestant heritage.98 This adds 
an extra air of interest to the Israeli dynamic. What is also interesting, is that Loyalist 
solidarity with Israel has since 2002, has been increasingly expressed by Unionist politicians.  
Several members of the DUP have defended and declared support for Israel, including senior 
MP’s, Ian Paisley Jr. and Jeffrey Donaldson. 99 Concern was even raised by former DUP Lord 
Mayor, Brian Kingston when Omar Barghouti, the leader of Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions, 
visited Belfast in 2017, due to fear he might “increase tensions in the city”.100  
Aside from the examples of Loyalist expressions of solidarity with Israel, much can be 
gleaned from the pages of the Belfast News Letter. What is particularly revealing, is the News 
Letter’s reporting of issues and news stories related to Israel. Many of these articles and 
opinion pieces have a clear pro-Israeli bias, thus providing an example of the rise of Loyalist 
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solidarity with Israel and insight into the reasons behind this stance. What is so apparent from 
the News Letter, is the greater presence of articles supporting Israel since 2002. In the 
appendix, three charts have been drawn up, to show the bias within News Letter articles. Bias 
was interpreted as praise for Israeli actions and a distinct lack of criticism when suitable, or 
positive connotations of Israel in contrast to the negative image of Palestine. The results for 
these charts have been divided into three categories: pro-Israeli, anti-Israeli and 
neutral/irrelevant. It is worth noting, that the neutral/irrelevant position is the most significant 
in all three charts. This is in part due to the fact that the removal of articles that lacked 
relevance would have made any attempt to replicate the charts impossible, due to 
interpretational differences in textual analysis.  
Figure 1 shows prior to 2002, mainly non-partisan reporting from the News Letter on issues 
relating to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. The majority of articles are either neutral in their 
reporting or lack relevance, such as scientific developments involving Israeli scientists or 
human-interest stories. A level of objectivity is usually expected with a newspaper, and there 
is no exception during this period. Many of these articles objectively deal with reports on the 
peace process and internal Israeli politics. Out of the 26 articles available during this four-
year period, two showed signs of Israeli bias and two Palestinian. These results show an 
impartial newspaper, as there is no distinct bias towards either side in the Conflict. Those 
articles with bias do not appear to show any upward trend but rather appear sporadically.101 
As been noted by Hill et al, the increased prevalence of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict 
appears in 2002 and continues from then onwards. Figure 2 shows that this rise was sharp. 
Close to half the articles produced relating to Israel in 2002 showed signs of pro-Israeli bias, 
in contrast to just two negative articles about Israel. 2002, also has the greatest quantity of 
articles produced in relation to Israel with 22, discussing the Jewish State. The rapid increase 
in not only pro-Israeli support in the News Letter, but also discussion of the Israeli-
Palestinian Conflict, can in part be connected to the emergence of Israeli flags in Loyalist 
areas in response to the Palestinian flags amongst Republicans, as described by Hill et al.102 
Interestingly, after 2002, while the quantity of articles related to Israel gradually decreases, 
the inclusion of articles supporting Israel does not. Equally surprising is that there are no 
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signs of anti-Israeli articles from 2003 onwards.103 Figure 3 provides a more detailed look at 
the articles available on the online archive of the News Letter between 2009 and the end of 
December 2017. Many of these articles are opinion pieces from the Loyalist public, some of 
which shall be discussed in this section. The results of Figure 3 show that out of 152 articles, 
38% displayed a pro-Israeli bias, in contrast to just 8% which held any anti-Israeli views or 
criticism.104 While these charts do not show an exact uphill trend in pro-Israeli bias, it is clear 
that there has been a major shift towards support of Israel from 2002 onwards. It is also worth 
noting that the current Likud government’s victory in 2009, appears to have had little or no 
impact on the continuation of articles that support Israel. The rhetoric of Likud, in 
commemorating Zionist terrorists, would lead us to expect that Loyalist support would 
decrease at this point. If anything, since 2009 there appears to have been a slight upsurge in 
pro-Israeli pieces in the News Letter.  
When engaging with a selection of these articles, we see examples of the bias that has 
continued from 2002. In reporting the 2008-09 Gaza War, the News Letter paid more 
attention to opinion in Northern Irish circles, than the actual conflict.  Events surrounding the 
conflict were to an extent relayed through an article which centred around a Belfast Protestant 
Pastor who defended the military actions of Israel in Gaza. It sympathetically explains that 
the Pastor, Paul Burns, had a Jewish uncle who escaped Austria as the Nazis arrived in 1938. 
Burns, then explains his reasons for supporting Israel’s military action in Gaza. He equates 
Nazi desires to “exterminate” the Jews and a similar message from “Muslim clerics” in the 
countries surrounding Israel. Bizarrely, this small lead-in, is juxtaposed to the rest of the 
article which mentions calls for peace from religious and political figures. The article also 
avoids any real discussion of more controversial debates such as the “humanitarian crisis”. 
Instead it focuses more on the British government’s call for a ceasefire.  105  
Several other articles also displayed pro-Israeli sentiment in 2009. One article, gave a 
message of support to Israel from the Loyalist community in Northern Ireland. Both the DUP 
and Traditional Unionist Voice, stated that the international outrage surrounding the actions 
of Israel, did not consider the “thousands of rocket attacks” that Israel had experienced from 
the terrorists. The article quoted TUV MEP Jim Allister as saying that Hamas’ “murderous 
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mayhem” against citizens, “fully entitled” Israel to defend itself. Allister then immediately 
linked this to Irish Republicanism, claiming he was “not surprised that Sinn Fein, whose IRA 
also cared nothing for civilians, are loud apologists for the Palestinian terrorist cause”. 106  
Another article told of the fear Israeli workers in Belfast had for their safety during a 
demonstration by the Republican group Eirigi, calling for a “boycott of Israeli goods”. The 
article indicates that the stalls owned by the Israelis, selling Dead Sea products were 
“stormed” by the protestors and an attempt to “trash” them was made. At a later point in the 
article, a quote is given; “People are only getting one side of the conflict now – it’s not 
objective”. This is mentioned immediately after the paper reminds the reader that Israel 
endured Hamas bombing before the commencing of the conflict. 107 Interestingly, a video of 
the protest can be found on Youtube. While the protest is perhaps intimidating, there is little 
evidence of an attempt to ‘trash the stalls’, other than propaganda pamphlets being dropped 
from the floor above by Eirigi.108  
What is so striking about the News Letters articles, is the way in which they deviate from the 
mainstream British media. Left of centre papers such as the Independent and the Guardian, 
published articles during the 2008-09 conflict that could be considered critical of Israel. 109 110 
Even the more unionist-light paper the Belfast Telegraph, published articles that reported on 
the suffering of Palestinians during the conflict.111 The nearest criticism Israel receives in any 
article from the News Letter is that she must do more to end the conflict. Yet these articles 
still contain comments such as “Israel must assert its dominance over Hamas”112 and “The 
Israeli cause has the sympathy of many people in Northern Ireland, who know the pain and 
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suffering brought by years of terrorist atrocities and share the feeling of isolation from world 
opinion”.113  This is a clear indication of the News Letter’s Loyalist sympathies towards 
Israel.  When Britain’s relationship with Israel has made the national headlines, the News 
Letter, despite Loyalist support for Britain, has often expressed divergent views from the 
British government and public in general. In fact, it could be argued that they regularly take 
the side of Israel before Britain. In 2014, Labour MP Grahame Morris brought forward a 
motion to urge the Government to “recognise the state of Palestine, alongside the state of 
Israel” to promote a negotiated two-state solution. Out of 274 votes, 262 voted in favour of 
the motion and 12 against. 114 Of those against, five were from the DUP. It was reported in 
the News Letter that the vote legitimised Hamas, and the DUP stated that those MPs who had 
voted in favour of the motion were not to blame, but rather they had been misinformed.115  
The Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions campaign, has gained a reasonable amount of 
traction in the UK. As of 2017, 16 British Universities have joined the BDS movement.116 
The News Letter has been critical of the movement and its intentions. In October of 2016, it 
suggested that councillors in Londonderry (Derry to Republicans), should give up their 
council-issued iPads, as they used flash memory which was produced by Israeli company 
Anobit. Within the article, it used quotes from DUP Member of the Legislative Assembly, 
Gary Middleton, which referred to BDS as “discriminatory” and “futile” due to the wide 
usage of items with Israeli products in them.117  
There are important news stories in relation to British diplomatic grievances with Israel, that 
do not appear on either the News Letter’s online archive, or the Factiva Database. For 
example, events that received a high amount of coverage in the British mainstream media; 
such as the usage of forged British passports by Mossad, during an assassination in Dubai in 
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2010 and the attempt by British lawyers and activists to have both Israeli Defence Minister 
Ehud Barak and Major-General Doron Almog arrested on British soil. Of course, the paper is 
a regional paper, it has no obligation to report on all world events. However, these instances, 
particularly the passport fraud of 2010, received widespread coverage in the UK, from 
multiple news outlets.118 Several Irish national’s passports were also used in the scandal, so it 
appears odd that the News Letter did not cover this story. Following this, the Republic of 
Ireland expelled an Israeli diplomat, which was again not reported by the News Letter.119 This 
could potentially suggest that the News Letter did not wish to publish these stories. It was 
perhaps felt that the negative press for Israel over these incidents was something that could be 
avoided; it may have provided an opportunity for criticism of Israel therefore risking a 
backlash from the Loyalist readership.  
Instances do exist of criticisms of Israel in the News Letter, as shown in Figure 3. Gary 
Spedding is perhaps the most prominent of these, a Belfast resident whose vocal criticism of 
Israel saw him deported from the Middle East to Britain, for what Israeli authorities referred 
to as “a violent protest” in Belfast in the months prior to his visit.120 In the period following 
his return to the UK, Spedding wrote opinion pieces for the News Letter, where he criticised 
Israel’s occupation of the Palestinian territories and the heavy-handedness of the IDF towards 
the Arab population.121 The reaction his writing received in the News Letter was 
overwhelmingly negative. It accused of Spedding of being a leader of a protest with “anti -
Semitic undertones”. Readers and staff argued that Israel had every right to remove 
Spedding, despite him not being involved in any violence during the protest. It was then 
claimed that support for pro-Palestinian causes are easily “hijacked” by “anti-democratic” 
and “anti-Semitic” elements, requiring Israel to be even more careful with the likes of 
Spedding.122 The constant need to rebuke any articles critical of Israel has continued to the 
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present day. It appears that when an individual writes a piece critical of Israel,  it is necessary 
for a member of the Loyalist community to safeguard Israel’s honour. A 2017 article of 
Speeding’s criticising Israel’s human rights record, was criticised by Colin Nevin for its 
“very disturbing tone”123 
Writers appear to be on the defensive in most of these articles and appear convinced that the 
wider media is anti-Israeli. Many refer to Israel as “the only democracy in the Middle East” 
and find it shameful that it receives such a great degree of condemnation from the 
international community, particularly considering the poor record of free speech, treatment of 
women and homosexuals in neighbouring states. 124 Ironically, the DUP are in favour of 
Northern Ireland continuing to be the only part of the United Kingdom where gay marriage is 
prohibited.125Pro-Israeli articles seem to be a response to international and local criticism of 
Israel. One article even promoted a campaign to “stop Israel bashing” after the UN women’s 
rights commission’s singled out Israel over treatment of Palestinian women126 There is also 
an element of projection, linking the situation in Israel and Palestine, to that of Northern 
Ireland; an article even stated that Loyalists and Israelis shared “common values” in the face 
of terror.127 Analysing the articles of the News Letter can provided us with a possible 
explanation as to why the rise in Figure 2 is not continuous; Loyalists appear to jump to 
Israel’s defence after it has been criticised, rather than take the offensive and continuously 
promote Israel.  
 
4.3 The Likud Conundrum 
In this section, the actions of the ruling Likud government in Israel, in commemorating 
members of Irgun and Lehi shall be discussed. The section shall also shed light on the 
reception these commemorations have had within British circles. Finally, it shall analyse the 
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impact upon Loyalist solidarity and look to see if the history of the past 70 years has been 
recognised by Loyalist discourse surrounding the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict.  
The origin of the Likud party is steeped in the Zionist terrorist actions of the 1930s and 40s. 
The forerunners of the party stemmed from the right-wing of the Zionist movement in the 
1920s known as the Revisionist movement. The Revisionists, would later go on to create the 
paramilitary organisations, including Irgun, who became renowned for their terrorist activity 
against the British and Arabs in the late 30s, until Israeli independence in 1948.128 After 
independence, members of the Irgun formed part of the Israeli political right, the core of this 
being the Herut Party, led by former Irgun leader, Menachem Begin. In 1973, Begin was 
chosen to lead a united group of parties including Herut, the Liberal Party, Free Centre, the 
Labour Movement for Greater Israel and the National List, which established themselves as 
the Likud Party. The party prided itself on the preservation of Jewish tradition and culture 
and was also ideologically committed to “historic Eretz Yisrael”; the expansion of Israeli rule 
over territory mentioned in the Hebrew Scriptures as having been at one time under Jewish 
rule.129 This ideological motive has been controversial in the eyes of the world and has led 
the party to adopt a hard line towards the conditions surrounding potential Palestinian 
statehood. Likud has been continuously in power since 2009, with the election of Benjamin 
Netanyahu, who had already served a term as Prime Minister between 1996 to 1999.  
While the Israeli government often claims to be at the forefront of fighting terrorism, their 
perception of the actions by Irgun and Lehi (also known as the Stern Gang) does not fit the 
common world view. Not only have former members of Zionist terror organisations, such as 
Begin and fellow former Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, found political success within 
parties such as Likud but they have also been cast in Israeli history as heroes. During his 
premiership, Shamir created a Lehi Museum and Archives in remembrance of former 
“freedom fighters” who committed acts of violence against the British administration and 
civilians.130 Since the start of the 21st century, it appears that acts of commemoration for such 
groups has increased, as milestone anniversaries have approached. In 2011, to mark 70 years 
since his death, Avraham Stern, a leader of the Irgun, was commemorated with a postage 
stamp. Stern also had a town named after him Kokhav Ya’ir, Ya’ir’s star (Stern’s alias). 
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Monuments have been erected in honour of Irgun casualties such as in Tel-Aviv in 2016, 
where a monument was created to honour the victims of the Altalena affair. The incident saw 
16 members of the Irgun killed by the Israeli Defence Forces after refusing to handover arms. 
The Altalena has become symbolic of the confrontation between the left and the right in 
Israel and the commemoration of this continues Likud’s rhetoric.131 Netanyahu has even 
taken umbrage over others daring to classify Irgun and Lehi as terrorist organisations. 
According to the mouthpiece of religious Zionism, Arutz Sheva, the IDF Education and 
Youth Corps referred to Irgun and Lehi as “organisations of terrorism”. After getting wind of 
the report from Arutz Sheva, Netanyahu was reportedly outraged and demanded that the 
document containing the reference be taken down immediately. The document was then 
removed, to prevent further use by IDF officers and instructors.132   
Commemorations of the Irgun and Lehi have not gone unnoticed in the UK. It has created 
tension between the British government and Israel. The most significant instance of this was 
in July of 2006, when a decision was made by the Israeli government to commemorate the 
60th anniversary of the bombing of the King David Hotel. Outside of the hotel, a plaque was 
unveiled that read: 
“The hotel housed the Mandate Secretariat as well as the Army Headquarters. On July 22, 
1946, Irgun fighters at the order of the Hebrew Resistance Movement planted explosives in 
the basement. Warning phone calls had been made urging the hotel's occupants to leave 
immediately. For reasons known only to the British, the hotel was not evacuated and after 25 
minutes the bombs exploded, and to the Irgun's regret and dismay 91 persons were killed.”133 
The plaque rounded off an academic conference held by the Menachem Begin Heritage 
Centre, which Netanyahu addressed.134 At the hotel, several right-wing politicians from the 
Likud Party were in attendance and the plaque was unveiled by former Irgun fighters. The 
British Foreign Office, expressed anger, particularly over the line that claimed the British had 
been warned of the attack. The British ambassador to Israel, Simon MacDonald condemned 
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the commemorations. He stated, “There is no credible evidence that any warning reached the 
British authorities” and argued that the whole commemoration was immoral; “We do not 
think it is right for an act of terrorism to be commemorated”. In light of considerable pressure 
the plaque was amended, to drop the insinuation that the British had been made aware, prior 
to the bombing.135 
Awareness of this issue in Northern Ireland has been minimal. The News Letter did not report 
on the issue surrounding the plaque on the King David Hotel. The Loyalists don’t appear to 
have had any discussions about their Israeli comrades commemorating the killings of British 
soldiers. Perhaps it is an issue worth avoiding, something that risks over complicating and 
even jeopardising their solidarity. On the internet, small blog posts and articles do exist that 
question the Loyalist relationship with Israel, considering Israel’s past. One such article, 
entitled “Unionism and Israel: Holy Land is not a hotter version of Ulster…” was posted on 
Northern Irish news and opinion portal Slugger O’Toole in 2010. In the article, a self-
proclaimed “liberal unionist” under the alias of Dodrade, writes a scathing attack of the 
Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, being utilised as a proxy war in Northern Ireland. The bulk of this 
criticism falls on the Loyalist/Unionist camp for its solidarity with Israel, which the author 
does not share, “in remembrance of the victims of Zionist terrorism against the British”.136 
The article’s obvious attempts to generate some kind of debate seems to have failed; the vast 
majority of the comments section does not debate the concerns the author has raised but 
rather dissolves into a morass of esoteric tribalism that is essentially “Israel vs. Palestine” and 
“Republicans vs. Loyalists”. 
While a single article on a weblog is not likely to fuel the fires of debate, the News Letter 
published an article back in 2002, that quotes from Ulster Unionist Party MLA Esmond 
Birine, who also questioned the solidarity link. At the point of publishing, Birine was the 
MLA for Belfast South; claimed by the New Statesman to be one of the most closely 
contested seats between Loyalist/Unionists and Republicans in Northern Ireland.137 In his 
article, Birnie questions the support of Israel by his fellow Loyalists. The issue was brought 
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to Birine’s attention by the flag display, as described by Hill et al. The unorthodox element to 
Birnie’s argument is that he makes connections between Zionism and Irish Republicanism, 
whilst focusing on both groups guerrilla conflicts against Britain. He asks Loyalists who fly 
the Israeli flag to consider the acts of Zionist terrorism against the British in Palestine and 
asserts there to be “no real linkage with unionism/loyalism to be celebrated”. The article 
mentions one response to Birnie, which comes from “a senior Loyalist” who states that the 
affiliation is purely down to a response to pro-Palestinian sentiment in the Republican camp; 
“if one side said we’re supporting Argentina, the other will say we back Uruguay”. Oddly 
enough, the “senior Loyalist” then goes on to link Protestant Orangeism with “the life of 
Israel and the five-point Star of David”.138  This brief interaction, is the one of the closest 
instances of public debate within the Loyalist community on the issue.  
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5. Analysis of the Loyalist Case 
5.1: The ‘Siege Mentality’  
In many of the studies that tackle Loyalist solidarity with Israel, it is found that many 
Loyalists site a “siege mentality” and similarities with the Israeli position, as one of the key 
reasons for their solidarity. They believe that they share a similar position geopolitically, both 
being surrounded by enemies. It is argued, that both are engaged in a fight against terrorism 
and a hostile indigenous “other.” There is also the view that the international community is 
against both Israel and the existence of Northern Ireland as part of the United Kingdom. With 
the Good Friday Agreement of 1999, the future position of the Loyalist community appeared 
uncertain, therefore seeking out of allies is not an unexpected move. The question remains, 
have strong similarities with Israel led to an increased expression of solidarity with Israel?  
The similarities with Israel which Loyalists appear to identify with, can be placed into three 
categories; siege mentality, fighting terrorism and the perception of the international 
community. Arar would argue that through borrowed legitimacy, any comparison, regardless 
of how minor, can be utilised to provide legitimacy in maintaining ethnic boundaries.139 
However, if those similarities are more significant, Arar would argue, there is more to 
Loyalist solidarity than an attempt just to antagonise Republicans.  The lack of discourse 
around Zionist terrorists amongst Loyalist communities suggests that solidarity with Israel 
has significance; it is a relationship they wish to maintain.  
One of the most common assumptions made by Loyalists is that both their community and 
Israel are in a state of siege. This has been mentioned in a wide selection of studies, including 
Doyle (2007), Rolston (2009) and Hill et al (2008). What is difficult understand is the exact 
nature of the threat to the Loyalists, particularly in the present day. Israel is perceived to be 
facing a siege from the Arab nations that surround its borders and an element of this is attacks 
from Palestinian terrorism.140 However in Northern Ireland, since the Good Friday 
Agreement, the Republican terrorist threat to Loyalists has been greatly reduced, apart from a 
few dissident republicans who did not accept the terms of the Agreement. Yet according to 
MI5, the attacks from dissident republican groups such Continuity IRA, the new IRA and 
Óglaigh na hÉireann, have been “steady” since 2000. Since the formation of dissident 
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groups, MI5 has counted five fatalities caused by the dissidents, all taking place between 
2009 and 2012.141 All attacks were focused on members of the security forces, rather than the 
Loyalist community. Whilst MI5 does note the threat to life posed by these attacks, it is 
nowhere near the same quantity as in Israel.  According to the Israeli government, since 
September 2015, 59 people have been killed and 827 people have been injured in relation to 
terrorism.142 The distinct decrease in terrorist activity directed towards them, would suggest 
that the Loyalist ‘siege mentality’ comes from some other issue in Northern Irish society.  
It could be argued that demographics now pose the greatest threat to the Loyalist community. 
The Protestant community in Northern Ireland, to which Loyalists belong, has seen a 
downturn in their population share. The 2011 census in Northern Ireland showed that 
Protestants made up 48.36% of the population, in comparison to 45.15% who were 
Catholic.143 This is a sharp change from the 2001 census, where Protestants made 53.13% of 
the population, while Catholics were at 43.76%.144 This has led to more cause for concern 
being raised in the Loyalist community. Out of children born since 2008, 44% are Catholic 
and 31% Protestant. This leads to questions emerging over the future of Northern Ireland 
within the United Kingdom, assuming that this religious demographic continues to hold 
traditional ideological positions, which seems likely. The Loyalist community is franticly 
trying to formulate a plan to divert, what appears to be inevitable.145 This shows how 
Loyalists could feel threatened. However, this seems to have less in common with the Israeli 
state, where Arabs only make up a fifth of Israel’s population of 8 million, excluding the 
occupied Palestinian territories.146 The imagery created by Loyalists has more similarities 
with Israeli settlements in the West Bank, considered illegal under international law; pockets 
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of gated communities surrounded by a hostile “other”. This is perhaps harking back to the 
historical memory of the first Ulster-Scots plantations during the 17th century.  
Loyalists also draw comparisons with Israel, as a result of the treatment they receive from the 
international community. They do not perceive the international community as having any 
sympathy with their situation, similar to the pressure that they believe Israel continually 
faces.147 According to Mitchell, whilst international law would dictate that the United 
Kingdom cannot abandon the Loyalist settlers in Northern Ireland, so long as they are a 
majority. They do not perceive there to be actual support for this in the International 
community who they believe would prefer to see a United Ireland.148 This tends to stem from 
the republicans, presenting their ideology as anti-imperialist, seeking liberation from 
oppression, which is more likely to gain sympathy.149 The settler position which loyalists 
hold, is not as attractive to the international community, as it smacks of colonialism. Thus, 
drawing comparisons to other British settler communities, such as Rhodesia in the 1960s and 
70s.150 Despite this perception, a united Ireland is not a major concern of the international 
community, which largely considers it as a decision for the people of Northern Ireland, even 
among those with republican sympathies. A good example of this would be the British 
Labour Party leader, Jeremy Corbyn.151 For Loyalists to claim that there is a similar degree of 
intensity amongst the international community, as is found regarding the Israeli-Palestinian 
Conflict, is quite frankly absurd. Significantly more pressure is place upon Israel, not 
questioning its right to exist but on allowing Palestinian self-determination to coexist 
alongside it. Israel’s actions, such as continuing to allow settlements in the West Bank, is 
what fuels most criticism from the international community and United Nations.152 There are 
also international activist networks such as BDS that challenge Israel’s position in the 
Palestinian territories. The only real pressure that Loyalists face, is from their Republican 
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rivals. The prevalent call is to sustain peace in Northern Ireland, not for the Loyalists to 
withdraw from republican territory.  
Finally, Loyalists utilise the concept of a ‘united front’ against terrorism.  The terrorist threat 
to the Loyalist community in Northern Ireland is no longer comparable to that of the Israelis. 
The Loyalist community has not been targeted in recent years by Republican dissidents, 
suggesting this is part of a historical emotion, a hangover of ‘siege mentality’. Yet Loyalists 
still staunchly claim to be standing against terrorism. They make much of Sinn Fein’s pro- 
Palestinian stance and their sympathies for Hamas. In taking this position, Loyalists make no 
mention of their own paramilitary organisations which existed during the Troubles. The 
Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) and Ulster Defence Association (UDA), the two main 
paramilitary organisations, were set up in 1965 to counter Republican attacks which were 
contributing to mounting unease in the Loyalist community. The strategies used by Loyalist 
paramilitary groups were similar to that of the IRA and other Republican terrorist groups. 
40,000-50,000 men were members of the UDA alone, conducting a terrorist campaign against 
the IRA and the Catholic population.153 Paramilitaries shot Catholic civilians indiscriminately 
and car bombs were commonplace.154 There were also attempts to “frame” Republican 
groups for attacks on public services, when explosives were set off at power stations, water 
pipelines and reservoirs.155 These strategies can be classed as acts of terror, damaging the 
Loyalist argument that they are opponents of terrorism and always have been.  Interestingly, 
the Zionist terrorists of the 1940s, did actually have some connections to Northern Ireland. 
However, this was not with the Loyalists, which they conveniently forget, but rather the 
Republican movement. Zionists were inspired by the actions of the IRA fighting the British 
during the 1920s. Inspiration was drawn from the unity that was created amongst the Irish 
people, especially after the executions following the 1916 Easter Rising. Begin sought to 
learn from the IRA when he began his armed rebellion against the British in 1944; noting that 
guerrilla methods similar to those that had been deployed by the IRA, would be required if 
the Zionists were to have any success. There was even the adoption of code names related to 
the Anglo-Irish war, Shamir used “Michael” after Michael Collins, the head of the IRA.156 
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Aside from inspiration, there was also the very real link of Robert Briscoe. Briscoe was the 
son of Lithuanian Jews and served in the IRA during the Anglo-Irish war and would later 
serve in the Dail. He was an ardent Zionist and attempted to create links between the Irgun 
and the IRA. An arrangement was made by Briscoe to have all Irgun literature and documents 
printed in Dublin and organise an Irish volunteers battalion to help the Zionist cause. 
However, his plans did not come to fruition, despite remaining as a special advisor to 
Begin.157 While this link may not be the strongest, it is another point that is rarely brought up 
by Loyalists. Birnie was quoted saying to the News Letter that connections existed between 
Irish Republicanism and Zionism, questioning why fellow Loyalists would chose to support 
Israel, regardless of this.158 Similar to Zionist attacks against the British, this is another area 
that does not receive debate in Loyalist circles.  
It is likely, that despite the decreased risk of terrorism in Northern Ireland for the Loyalists, 
the feeling of a siege mentality has increased. Demographics is certainly a factor in this, but 
the current political situation in Northern Ireland solidifies this notion. The Good Friday 
Agreement was not well received by all Loyalists. Whilst dramatically ending the violent 
aspects of the Conflict, the Agreement opened the door for a united Ireland by peaceful 
means through the Northern Ireland Assembly. Padraig O’Malley argues that negotiations, 
including the Good Friday Agreement, have been viewed with great scepticism in sections of 
the Loyalist community.  Loyalists viewing each negotiation as potentially leading to the 
unification of Ireland. This unification, he argues, would be considered by Loyalists as being 
“absorbed into and dominated by the larger Catholic culture, and that religious and cultural 
absorption would inevitability lead to extinction – ethnic cleansing of a different kind”.159 
The post-Good Friday Agreement is not one that secures Loyalist dominance. As of the 2017 
election, the Assembly has a near 50-50 split between Loyalists and Republicans. Out of the 
90 seats in the Assembly, 40 are held by Loyalists and 39 by Republicans (11 seats assigned 
to “other”). The election saw Sinn Fein increase its vote share by 3.9% while the largest 
Loyalist party the DUP, lost around 1.1%.160 The demographic shift in the country, in theory 
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should swing future elections further in favour of Republican parties. Therefore, the Good 
Friday Agreement can be regarded as pivotal for Loyalists and their position in British 
society.  
 
5.2 Loyalist Historic-Theological Memory 
The role of religion in Loyalist society cannot be underestimated. Whilst much of Western 
society is witnessing an increase in secularisation and a move away from Christian values, 
religion continues to play a significant role in Northern Irish society. Church attendance may 
have declined; however Northern Ireland sees the greatest church attendance in the UK, with 
45% of people still attending church weekly; that is not to say the other 55% is secular.161 
According to Orla Muldoon et al, the process of secularisation in Northern Ireland has been at 
a significantly slower pace than that of neighbouring states. It is also worth noting that only 
8% of people identified themselves as having no religious affiliation.162 What also must be 
recognised is the way in which the Protestant faith has influenced Loyalist culture, and the 
way they perceive themselves in the world. Faith, in the form of historic memory has played 
its part in Loyalist solidarity with Israel and is a potential factor for its rise in recent years. By 
going back to their forefathers, the Ulster-Scot settlers of the 17th century, a greater insight 
into the role of faith may be achieved.  In addition, in more modern times, solidarity may find 
its links with forms of ‘British Israelism’ and ‘Christian Zionism’, similar to that witnessed in 
the United States. Many of the American Christian Zionists, have strong beliefs surrounding 
judgement day and the second coming of Christ, which could have an appeal amongst 
Loyalist Presbyterians. It is also worth exploring the significance of Biblical Israel within 
Loyalist culture, which may explain the reluctance of Loyalists are to tackle Israeli on Zionist 
terrorism.    
Historically, the majority of Loyalists are descendants of Presbyterians who came from the 
Scottish Lowlands. They settled in Ulster from 1606, during the reign of James VI & I. The 
aim was to transform the Irish landscape, to bring “the light of civilization to a benighted 
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Celtic backwater”.163 They were culturally distinguishable from the indigenous Catholic 
population and within a short period of time, gained hegemony over them. In 1600, the 
Catholic population owned over 80% of land in Ireland and by 1700, this proportion had 
fallen to just a mere 14%, with the influx of Ulster-Scots settlers.164 The Presbyterian culture 
in Ulster had a strong adherence to scripture and church discipline within everyday life. They 
were Calvinist, believing in predestination and that salvation would only be for the “elect”. 
Central to their theological outlook, according to Akenson, was their continued reference to 
the Old Testament.165 
Desire to be part of the elect and their focus on the Old Testament, combined with the 
situation that the Ulster-Scots found themselves in, led to the belief that they were in some 
way significant in God’s plan. Many of the Presbyterian congregations found it easy to 
identify with Biblical Israel. They believed that they had been led by God to a “promised 
land.”  They were blessed as they had managed to take control of this land despite the hostile 
indigenous population, who were not to be considered true adherents of the Christian faith.166 
It was stated that the native Irish were not part of the elect, they were compared to the Hittites 
and Canaanites; they were enemies of God.167 This was just one of the many examples of 
biblical comparison that was made by the Ulster-Scots settlers between themselves and the 
Israelites. The imagery of their farmhouses surrounded by antagonistic foes, was likened to 
walled cities from the Biblical era. They were symbols of protection for the community from 
what lay outside. Akenson argues, that while they were aware that they were not the Chosen 
People, a privilege reserved for the Jews, they believed with conviction that they were a 
Chosen People.168 This would be reaffirmed by so-called “acts of deliverance” which 
included victories against the Jacobites, who were supported by the Catholic population, at 
the siege of Derry in 1688 and the Battle of the Boyne in 1690.169 These historical emotions 
would continue into the 20th century. Northern Ireland was established under the influence of 
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the Ulster Covenant, which promised that the land would be a Protestant state, which would 
be upheld and defended by the Protestant population and the will of God.170 
The Loyalist theological infatuation with Israel has also reached the point of mythological, 
pseudo-Christianity. Steve Bruce argues that during the Troubles, there existed an extreme 
view within the Loyalist camp that they were descended from one of the “lost tribes of 
Israel”.171 Amongst those who subscribed to this view were; Loyalist politician, and 
Orangeman, Rev. Robert Bradford (assassinated by the IRA in 1981), UVF member Clifford 
Peeples and William McGrath founder of the esoteric Loyalist movement Tara.172 Another 
example would be Loyalist politician and former DUP MLA, Nelson McCausland who has 
encouraged the idea of Ulster Scots being considered amongst the Lost Tribes.173 All were 
staunch ‘British Israelites’, at a time when this is no longer a popular ideology in the rest of 
the UK. They held these views very much through an Ulster lens, focusing on the ethnic 
identity of Ulster Loyalists as people of God, similar to views held by their settler forefathers. 
While Bruce does not credit this sect’s views as being dominant within the Loyalist 
community, it is a clear example of the extension of the early beliefs held by the Ulster-Scot 
settlers of the 17th century into the modern era. There is little doubt that the historic 
fascination with Biblical Israel has influenced Loyalists’ present-day perception of modern 
Israel.  
The theological stance towards Israel that is present in sectors of the Loyalist community, 
lends itself to comparisons with Christian Zionism. This is more commonly associated with 
the United States and is an ideology that has not gained much support in Britain.174 Some of 
the extremists within the Loyalist community clearly express views which are similar to those 
found more commonly in the United States. The language used by both groups has a strong 
evangelical tone.  In the News Letter, connections are made between Israel and faith. George 
McNally quotes from Genesis 12:3, “You do good things to the Jewish people, and God will 
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bless you”.175 In another article, the same verse is used again, in an attempt to argue that 
boycotting Israel “should not cross anyone’s mind”.176 Biblical phraseology appears 
frequently used to justify modern political rhetoric. Colin Nevin, argues that Arabs have no 
claim on any of the “Promised Land” as God gave the Jews “the title-deed to the ‘Land of 
Milk and Honey’”.177 The Northern Ireland Friends of Israel website makes use of similar 
rhetoric, referring to the existence of a “secure and confident Israel”, as being “a blessing to 
the whole world”.178 Akin to many Christian Zionists, the Rev. Ian Paisley, figurehead of the 
Loyalist community, believed that the return of Israel and Jerusalem to Jewish control 
signifies the second coming of Christ. Paisley was one of the founding members of NIFI and 
had connections with the Irish Christian Friends of Israel.179  
Irish Christian Friends of Israel, holds the objective of reminding Christians of the Jewish 
roots of their faith. On their website we can see a focus on God’s promise of a homeland for 
the Jews and the preparation for judgement day.180 This rhetoric is similar to the apocalyptic 
nature of the majority of Christian Zionists, who emphasise the need to prepare for the ‘End 
Times’.181 The focus on judgement day is perhaps something that has been picked up by 
some of the more ardent religious supporters of Israel in the Loyalist community. Some of the 
more unique examples that have arisen in Northern Ireland, are very similar to those in the 
United States. In Belfast, the Shalom Messianic Congregation of Northern Ireland, aims to 
“re-educate believers in the Hebraic roots of their faith”.182 The congregation is mostly Ulster 
Protestant, rather than consisting of Jews who live in Northern Ireland and have accepted 
Jesus as the Messiah. The Northern Irish founder of the congregation, Jim Clint, has been 
involved in charity work related to Israel, by assisting eastern European Jews to make the 
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Aliyah to Israel.183 Clint was interviewed by Ithamar Handelman Smith in his documentary, 
Shalom Belfast, where he expressed his own desire to make the Aliyah, despite his inability to 
do so. Clint stated that his heart was Jewish, identifying with this more so than his own 
heritage in Northern Ireland.184 While this sort of faith is on the far fringes of Loyalist 
society, this is not to say that it has not influenced this society.  A convergence seems to have 
taken place here between the Ulster-Scots Presbyterian heritage and Christian Zionism. The 
scale to which Christian Zionist views are subscribed to within the Loyalist community is 
debatable, however there is little quarrel with the ideological outcome.  There is a long 
history in this community of theological reasoning impacting on their views and many still 
attempt to utilise it to this day. The belief in Israel, stems from their heritage and has surely 
assisted in positive perceptions of Israel and ‘Israelites’ throughout the generations. While 
piety in the UK may not be as paramount today as it was at the dawn of the previous century, 
it still plays a significant role in Northern Ireland. In still having a significant role to play, 
individuals have been able to harness religious belief to affirm their solidarity with Israel. 
The historical memory of the glorification and association with the Israelites, has made 
association with Israel appear more appropriate to the Loyalist community. After all, the 
divisions in Northern Ireland have been often highlighted by boundaries between faiths. To 
assert one’s political motivations, by referring to Biblical sources, is nothing new in this part 
of the world.   
 
5.3 In Support of Borrowed Legitimacy 
Before concluding this thesis, it would seem suitable to re-address the theory of borrowed 
legitimacy as put forward by Arar. Many of the factors described throughout this thesis have 
provided alternative reasons for the rise and continuation of Loyalist solidarity with Israel 
and why it transcends concern for the commemoration of Zionist terrorism. However, it is 
also appropriate to provide some support for borrowed legitimacy. Many aspects of the 
theory are relevant, particularly in relation to the utilisation of symbolism and flags in the 
Loyalist community. The theory is also useful in highlighting a number of the contradictions 
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that exist while professing solidarity with Israel, whilst within a community some hold far-
right views.  
In Arar’s focus on flags and her argument that they are displayed as a means of ‘vilification’ 
of the international ‘other’ and as an attempt to attack the local ‘other’ by proxy, it would 
seem she has a good point. If we simply look at the timing of Israel flags being displayed in 
Loyalist areas of Belfast, immediately after the surge in Palestinian flags in Republican areas 
during the 2002 intifada; it appears that this was a clear attempt to antagonise Republicans. 
Loyalist affinity towards Israel already existed, however the flag display was a form of 
participation in the conflict against Republicans. As Hill et al mention, the increased visibility 
of Republican solidarity with Palestine led the Loyalists to speak up about their own support 
for Israel and to display Israeli flags.185 Fragments of support certainly existed pre-2002, 
however at this specific moment, there was an opportunity to attack the ‘other’. 
Arar’s argument can be further supported when looking at the presence of borrowed 
legitimacy in the civic society of the Troubles. This was not exclusive to Northern Ireland 
and has more relevance to the Republican diaspora and Unionist Protestants in Scotland. 
Football clubs, Glasgow Rangers and Celtic have been traditionally supported by Loyalists 
and Republicans respectively; in both Scotland and Ireland. Interestingly, supporters of Celtic 
have taken up solidarity with the Palestinian cause, as Republicans have in Northern Ireland. 
Along with the typical sight of Irish tricolours at football matches, it has become common to 
see Celtic supporters fly Palestinian flags. Supporters even went as far as to fly the flags at an 
away fixture in Israel against Hapoel Be’er Sheva, resulting in a £75K fine, which was 
matched by a donation of £200K by Celtic supporters to Palestinian charities.186 It would be 
of no surprise, according to borrowed legitimacy, if the fans of Rangers were to wave Israeli 
flags and of course this has been the case. While not to going to the same level of resilience 
in their flag display, sightings at matches have been made.187 Alasdair McKillop of the 
Rangers Supporters Trust has questioned the actual support for Israel from the club’s fans, 
attributing it to “tit-for-tat” dynamics in Glasgow. The similarities to borrowed legitimacy in 
Belfast are striking, as this seems to support Arar’s work.  
                                                 
185 Hill et al, “Flying Israeli Flags”:34.  
186 Kevin McKenna, “Why Celtic fans flew the flag for Palestine”, The Guardian, August 28, 2016, 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/aug/27/why-celtic-fans-flew-flag-for-palestine. 
187 Nathan Abrams, “Jews and Soccer: A Complicated Relationship”, Haaretz, August 7, 2013, 
https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/sports/.premium-1.540202. 
49 
 
Borrowed legitimacy can be well applied when studying the more hypocritical elements of 
Loyalist solidarity with Israel. This is nowhere more apparent than when looking at the far -
right fringes of Loyalist society. It has been noted that on occasion Loyalists have been 
known to drop displays of solidarity with Israel, to appease those supporters on the far-right, 
who possess anti-Semitic views. An example of this would be the visit of the British National 
Party to Belfast between 2003 and 2004, where Loyalists consciously removed Israeli flags 
from their housing schemes. This was done to avoid any offence to the BNP visitors.188 Many 
far-right groups such as the BNP and Combat 18 have provided the Loyalist community with 
support in standing against the unification of Ireland. The existence of Israeli flags on 
Loyalist streets did impact on their relationship with Combat 18, who threated to withdraw 
their support for the Loyalists, on the grounds that the organisation “hates all things Jewish, 
and surely all the Loyalist people of Ulster must realise this”.189 These instances reaffirm 
Arar’s argument that solidarity with Israel was intended for the local, rather than the 
international audience, merely to be utilised in conflict against Republicans.190 
To an extent, building upon Arar’s argument, it could be suggested that there is a general lack 
of knowledge about Israel and how it relates to the rest of the world by some of those in the 
Loyalist camp. In field work conducted by Robert Lambert, in 1989 at a football match 
between Chelsea and Tottenham Hotspur, he discovered some contradictory actions by fans. 
Lambert noted two Chelsea fans with “Red Hand Commando” tattoos, a paramilitary, linked 
to the UVF, who were deeply involved in anti-Semitic chants about Tottenham fans. 
Moments later, the same fans were discussing their intentions to attend a violent counter-
demonstration, which was to engage a pro-Palestinian demonstration in London the following 
weekend. Lambert agrees with Arar, that there was a requirement, in Catholic-Protestant 
sectarianism in Northern Ireland and in the Celtic-Rangers dynamic in Scotland, to oppose 
allies of the other. However, he does not believe this is the full explanation as to why they do 
so.191 This study intends to conclude, it is not the only reason for solidarity with Israel 
amongst Loyalists.  
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6. Conclusion 
Loyalist solidarity with Israel is far more complex than it first appears. That is not to say that 
some of the notions of “tit-for-tat” politics are not relevant to this scenario. Arar’s analysis is 
not wrong, far from it. Much of what she argues is very much the case, solidarity with Israel 
is most certainly used to attack Republicans by proxy, yet it is not the entire story. While 
Borrowed legitimacy can explain the reaction to the Republicans flying Palestinian flags in 
2002, is doubtful if it alone is sufficient to explain the depth of solidarity with Israel which 
has been sustained beyond 2002. The intellectualising of solidarity as expressed by 
politicians and those contributing to discussion in the media draws on a wider range of 
factors than just borrowed legitimacy.  
The ‘siege mentality’ of the Loyalist community, appears to have become more important 
since the 1999 Good Friday Agreement. The Loyalists, suspicious of continued negotiations 
and agreements, see their place in British society being gradually signed away, as they 
continue to lose the demographic battle against the ever-growing Catholic population. With 
the Good Friday Agreement essentially ending the armed conflict and without appearing the 
aggressor, Loyalists have had to combat the encroachment on their position by peaceful 
means.  The events of 2002 provided them with such an opportunity. They were able to 
continue the war by proxy by going to the defence of Israel, in light of Republican support for 
the Palestinians. The continuation of the conflict in this way, allowed the Loyalists to 
continue asserting their distinctiveness from the rest of the Irish population.  
The continuation of solidarity with Israel provides the Loyalists with the opportunity of 
supporting a state that appears to suffer a great deal of criticism on the international stage. 
This is important in reinforcing the perception that Loyalists have of themselves, as being 
disliked by the international community, whether or not it is justified. To have friends abroad 
is regarded as important by the Loyalists, even if this relationship appears to be a one-way 
street. It could be argued that they gain solace from knowing that there are other people in the 
world, whom they perceive to be facing a similar siege to that of their own. This of course 
puts the Loyalists out of step with the rest of the British public, which is decidedly more pro-
Palestinian. It also puts the Loyalists at odds with their own loyalty to Britain, by 
disregarding Zionist terrorist actions during the 1940s. The evidence presented would suggest 
that Likud’s commemoration of groups such as Irgun, have gone virtually unquestioned by 
the Loyalist community.  It could simply be that it was easier for Loyalists to turn a blind eye 
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to this period of history, rather than to question their own logic regarding their support for 
Israel. However, the historic memory, of a glorified Israel and the Israelite people in Loyalist 
heritage may have impacted upon Loyalist views of Israel and provided them with a sort of 
immunity or at least a kind eye.  
Essentially, Loyalist solidarity with Israel, is made up of many components. Borrowed 
legitimacy, while in part relevant, does not answer the whole question when looking at the 
case of the Loyalists. Historical factors have produced a community which has unique and 
individual traits. This should not be underestimated when looking at the loyalist attachment to 
Israel, which runs deep in the culture and psychic of Northern Ireland’s Protestant Society. 
For Loyalists, there is a much greater emotional need when looking towards Israel. They are 
in a vulnerable position, in a new century with their position within the United Kingdom 
moving into unfamiliar territory. At times of uncertainty it is not unusual to look back to the 
past. Biblical Israel provides a historical and theological perspective, that has always given 
Ulster Scots a sense of identity and an affinity with Israel. This has been an essential part of 
the fabric of a Calvinist Presbyterianism, which has endured and sustained this community 
for centuries. In a society where religion still plays an important role today, it is little wonder 
that solidarity with Israel is easy for many Loyalists to pursue.  Finding solidarity with the 
modern equivalent, in uncertain times seems like a comforting option, whilst also being able 
to utilise this against the local Republican “other” as a form of borrowed legitimacy. While 
full blown Christian Zionism is perhaps only on the fringes of Loyalist society, Israel is still 
an essential part of the historic memory of mainstream Protestant Society in Northern Ireland 
even today. 
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8. Appendix:  
Figure 1. Bias prior to 2002 (Factiva Database) 
 
Figure 2. Bias 2002-Present (Factiva Database) 
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Figure 3. News Letter Online Archive Bias 2009-2017  
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